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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to define the counterpart of separa-
ble belief functions for capacities valued on a finite totally ordered set.
Evidence theory deals with the issue of merging unreliable elementary
testimonies. Separable belief functions are the results of this merging pro-
cess. However not all belief functions are separable. Here, we start with
a possibility distribution on the power set of a frame of discernment that
plays the role of a basic probability assignment. It turns out that any
capacity can be induced by the qualitative counterpart of the definition
of a belief function (replacing sum by max). Then, we consider a qualita-
tive counterpart of Dempster rule of combination applied to qualitative
capacities, via their qualitative Mo¨bius transforms. We study the class of
capacities, called separable capacities, that can be generated by applying
this combination rule to simple support capacities, each focusing on a
subset of the frame of discernment. We compare this decomposition with
the one of general capacities as a maximum over a finite set of necessity
measures. The relevance of this framework to the problem of information
fusion from unreliable sources is explained.
Keywords: Qualitative capacity · Evidence theory
Possibility theory · Information fusion
1 Introduction
Shafer’s evidence theory [21] essentially deals with the fusion of information items 
stemming from several more or less reliable testimonies (or sources). In their 
most basic forms, these unreliable information items take the form of subsets of a 
frame of discernment (supposed to contain the value of the parameter of interest) 
along with weights representing the extent to which the testimonies are credible. 
Shafer uses as a mathematical model a positive probability distribution, called 
basic probability assignment, over a family of subsets said to be focal. The total 
quantity of belief in a particular subset is represented by the belief function and 
the Mo¨bius transform allows to recover the basic probability assignment from 
the belief function in a univocal manner.
In this paper we focus on the representation and the management of uncer-
tainty in information of non quantitative nature. Indeed much knowledge is qual-
itative, often expressed verbally or diagrammatically. We are interested in the
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qualitative counterpart of Shafer’s evidence theory [21], where the basic prob-
ability assignment is turned into a basic possibility assignment whose weights
have 1 as maximum. This idea of a basic possibility assignment dates back to a
suggestion made in [12,13]. Since then, some authors have been interested by this
qualitative counterpart. For example, we can mention the papers [1,2,15,25]. In
[15], any monotonic set function (also called fuzzy measure [24]) is shown to be
equal to the maximum of necessity measures and to the minimum of possibility
measures. In [25], upper and lower possibilities and necessities are expressed in
terms of basic possibility assignments or of necessity assignments. The interest
of such possibility assignments have been already suggested in the context of
information fusion [1].
We consider a set of sources informing about the value of a parameter x of
interest. Each source delivers a proposition of the form x ∈ A, where A is a subset
of a frame of discernment Ω. An associated weight σ(A), belonging to a symbolic
totally ordered scale, reflects the credibility of this elementary testimony. This
is modelled by a basic possibility assignment whose weights are such that
– σ(A) < 1 (where 1 is the top of the scale) if A differs from Ω;
– σ(Ω) = 1 (under this condition, σ is said to be non-dogmatic);
– σ(B) = 0 for B = A,Ω otherwise.
Mind that σ(B) = 0 refers to the absence of support in favor of B (not its
impossibility), and the greater σ(A), the greater the support in favor of A. In
other words σ is formally a possibility assignment because it is normalized in the
sense of a possibility distribution, but its semantics is not exactly in agreement
with possibility theory. A mapping σ is also the qualitative counterpart of the
basic probability assignment of a simple support belief function. In this paper we
consider fuzzy measures obtained from the qualitative merging of such unreliable
elementary testimonies.
In the numerical setting, simple support functions are important in Shafer’s
theory as they model unreliable elementary testimonies, the fusion of which
(using Dempster rule of combination) yields so-called separable belief functions.
Here we study the qualitative counterpart of separable belief functions (intro-
duced in [6]). Namely we give necessary and sufficient conditions under which a
fuzzy measure can be decomposed in terms of unreliable testimonies, and check
whether this decomposition is unique. Moreover we start discussing the rele-
vance of this framework for information fusion. In many situations such as risk
analysis, experts express their knowledge about the likelihood of dreadful events
verbally, and these terms are then translated into numbers on a probability scale.
This paper starts an investigation on the possibility of directly expressing and
merging qualitative information of this kind.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, basic possi-
bility assignments and their combination by means of a qualitative counterpart
of Dempster rule of combination are recalled. In Sect. 3 we apply these notions to
the combination of non-dogmatic capacities via their qualitative Mo¨bius trans-
forms. Section 4 lays bare the class of separable qualitative capacities that are the
result of combining, by means of the qualitative Dempster rule, non-dogmatic
necessity functions induced by their focal sets. This combination is compared to
the decomposition of any capacity as a maximum of necessity functions. We show
that any capacity has a separable approximation that dominates it. Section 5
applies these results to the fusion of unreliable testimonies. It bridges the gap
with Belnap set-ups for inconsistent information handling and his 4-valued logic
on the one hand, and the method of maximal consistent subsets on the other
hand.
2 Framework and Notations
In evidence theory, a basic probability assignment m is used, which is a proba-
bility distribution over the power set of Ω, such that m(∅) = 0. A belief function
Bel(A) =
∑
∅=B⊆Am(B), which represents the total quantity of belief in the
subset A of Ω, is associated with only one mass function m computed from Bel
using the Mo¨bius transform.
2.1 Basic Possibility Assignments
Let L be a totally ordered scale with a bottom 0 and a top 1. Given a frame
of discernment Ω, information is represented by means of a mapping σ, called
basic possibility assignment, from 2Ω to L such that maxA⊆Ω σ(A) = 1 (top
normalization). If we stick to Shafer’s view, the σ function should reflect a set
of unreliable testimonies, whereby each claim of the form x ∈ A is weighted by
σ(A).
In this paper, in agreement with Shafer theory, we assume bottom-normal
possibility assignments, i.e., σ(∅) = 0. Similarly to Shafer theory, a basic possi-
bility assignment σ defines the following set function:
∀A ⊆ Ω, Belpos(A) = max
B⊆A
σ(B). (1)
Note that Belpos(∅) = 0, Belpos(Ω) = 1. It was very early pointed out
[13] that the set function Belpos can be any fuzzy measure or capacity, that
is a monotonic set function v on Ω, such that v(A) ≥ v(B) whenever B ⊆ A.
Conversely, any fuzzy measure v can be put in the form v(A) = maxB⊆A σ(B) for
a basic possibility assignment σ. In particular, the qualitative Mo¨bius transform
[9,18] of a fuzzy measure v is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Let v : 2Ω → L be a fuzzy measure. Its qualitative Mo¨bius trans-
form is a set-function v∗ defined by
∀A ⊆ Ω, v∗(A) =
{
v(A) if  ∃B ⊂ A s.t. v(B) = v(A),
0 otherwise.
Example 1. Consider a Boolean capacity v with range in {0, 1} and its qualita-
tive Mo¨bius transform v∗.
{ω1} {ω2} {ω3} {ω1, ω2} {ω1, ω3} {ω2, ω3} Ω
v 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
v∗ 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Clearly, we have v(A) = maxB⊆A v∗(B). Like in evidence theory, the sets A
such that v∗(A) > 0 are called focal sets. Note that for all focal sets A and B
such that B ⊂ A we have v∗(B) < v∗(A). The focal set A can be viewed as the
minimal set in the sense of inclusion with weight v(A). Like in evidence theory,
a capacity v is said to be non-dogmatic if Ω is a focal set of v, i.e., v∗(Ω) = 1
(indeed, 0 < v∗(Ω) < 1 is forbidden, since then v∗(A) < 1,∀A ⊆ Ω, which would
imply v(Ω) < 1).
The unicity of the basic probability assignment generating a belief function
is no longer satisfied in the qualitative setting as several basic possibility assign-
ments σ may yield the same capacity v such that v(A) = maxB⊆A σ(B). There is
actually a whole family of set functions (basic possibility assignments) generating
v, namely:
Σ(v) = {σ : ∀A ⊆ Ω, v(A) = max
B⊆A
σ(B)}
and they are such that σ ∈ Σ(v) if and only if σ ∈ [v∗, v]. An equivalence
relation on basic possibility assignments σ1 ∼ σ2 can be defined if and only if
Belposσ1 = Bel
pos
σ2
. The equivalence classes of relation ∼ are of the form Σ(v) for
all capacities v. Namely, σ1 ∼ σ2 to mean there is v such that σ1 ∈ Σ(v) and
σ2 ∈ Σ(v).
Remark 1. In a counterpart of Dempster’s approach [7], the σ function is the
result of mapping a set U equipped with a possibility distribution π to the set Ω
via a multivalued mapping Γ : U → 2Ω , whereby σ(A) = maxΓ (u)=A π(u)[13].
The understanding of Γ is as follows: each value u ∈ U is compatible with and
only with some value w ∈ Γ (u). Considering a selection function f : U → Ω of
Γ (f(u) ∈ Γ (u),∀u ∈ U), it is clear that the possibility distribution πf (w) =
maxf(u)=w π(u) yields a possibility measure Πf such that Bel
pos(A) ≤ Πf (A) ≤
Plpos(A) = max∅=A∩B σ(B). In other words, the imprecision due to Γ yields an
imprecise possibility measure. The peculiarity of Dempster-like upper and lower
possibilities is that a “lower possibility” is just any capacity, while an “upper
possibility” is just a possibility measure, contrary to the quantitative case, where
it is a more general set function. An upper possibility is the possibility measure
whose possibility distribution is the contour function πv(w) = maxw∈E v∗(E)
of v = Belpos. So, Plpos is not the conjugate of Belpos (i.e., Plpos(A) = 1 −
Belpos(Ac), for the complement Ac of A). In the qualitative setting there is a
disconnection between the notion of conjugate and the definition of the upper
possibility. This is explained in more details in [15]. The Dempster approach
to qualitative possibility can be viewed as defining imprecise possibilities, and
it encompasses standard possibilistic representations as a particular case. This
view of capacities as lower possibilities is at odds with the framework of our
paper, where a capacity is a kind of measure of support. 
2.2 Dempster-Like Combination of Basic Possibilistic Assignments
In Shafer’s evidence theory, the well-known Dempster rule of combination [21]
has a counterpart in our qualitative maxitive setting first suggested in [19]:
Definition 2. Let σ1 and σ2 be two basic possibility assignments. The conjunc-
tive combination rule is defined by
∀A ⊆ Ω, (σ1 ⊗ σ2)(A) = maxB∩C=Amin(σ1(B), σ2(C)).
However the conjunctive combination of equivalent basic possibility assign-
ments (generating the same fuzzy measure) may not yield equivalent basic pos-
sibility assignments: σ1 ∼ τ1 and σ2 ∼ τ2 do not imply σ1 ⊗ σ2 ∼ τ1 ⊗ τ2.
Example 2. Consider A,B,C with σ1(Ω) = 1, σ1(A) = α > σ1(A∩B) = β where
A ∩ B = ∅, and σ1(E) = 0 otherwise. Let τ1 = σ1 but for τ1(B) = β. Lastly
let σ2(C) = γ, with B ∩ C = ∅, σ2(Ω) = 1 and σ2(E) = 0 otherwise. Clearly,
σ1 ∼ τ1. Suppose A ∩ C = ∅. Note that (σ1 ⊗ σ2)(B ∩ C) = 0 and it yields a
capacity v12 such that v12(B ∩ C) = 0. However (τ1 ⊗ σ2)(B ∩ C) = min(β, γ)
yielding a capacity v′12 such that v
′
12(B ∩ C) = min(β, γ). 
The set function σ1 ⊗ σ2 is generally not even a basic possibility assignment
because σ1 ⊗ σ2 induces a monotonic set-function such that (σ1 ⊗ σ2)(∅) = 0
may occur. We may even get (σ1 ⊗ σ2)(∅) = 1 if the two possibility distributions
σ1 and σ2 bear on disjoint subsets, which makes the combination ineffective.
σ1 ⊗ σ2 is thus a basic possibility assignment provided that there does not exist
B and C such that B ∩ C = ∅ and σ1(B) > 0, σ2(C) > 0.
In order to respect the closure property for this combination rule, we can, in
conformity with evidence theory,
– either consider a more general class of monotonic set functions than capacities
whereby v(∅) > 0 is allowed. However it is not clear what it means.
– or modify the combination rule by bottom-renormalizing the result.
In [6], the bottom normalization condition (σ1 ⊗ σ2)(∅) = 0 is enforced
and added to Definition 2. In the following of the paper we use this bottom-
normalized conjunctive rule denoted by ⊗ˆ.
Definition 3. Let σ1 and σ2 be two basic possibility assignments. The bottom-
normalized conjunctive combination rule is defined by
(σ1 ⊗ˆσ2)(A) = (σ1 ⊗ σ2)(A) if A = ∅, and (σ1 ⊗ˆσ2)(∅) = 0.
The bottom-normalized combination rule is commutative; it possesses an
identity: the vacuous basic possibilistic assignment σ0, equal to 0 everywhere
except on Ω (σ0 ⊗ σ = σ for all σ); it is associative (even if not proved in [6]):
– if A = ∅, then (σ1 ⊗ˆσ2) ⊗ˆσ3(A) = (σ1 ⊗ σ2) ⊗ σ3(A) and ⊗ is associative
[13];
– (σ1 ⊗ˆσ2) ⊗ˆσ3(∅) = (σ
′ ⊗ˆσ3)(∅) = 0 and σ1 ⊗ˆ (σ2 ⊗ˆσ3)(∅)=(σ1 ⊗ˆσ
′′)(∅)=0.
However, the consequence of this new definition is that we may fail to pre-
serve top-normalization via combination, when there are no B and C such that
σ1(B) = σ2(C) = 1 with B ∩ C = ∅. Moreover, if the two possibility distribu-
tions σ1 and σ2 bear on disjoint subsets, we may even have (σ1 ⊗ˆσ2)(A) = 0 for
all A = ∅. This inconvenient does not appear if we restrict to basic possibilistic
assignments such σ(Ω) = 1, generating non-dogmatic fuzzy measures, which we
shall assume in the sequel.
3 Conjunctive Combination of Qualitative Capacities
In the following, we shall apply the combination rule to non-dogmatic capacities
v via their Mo¨bius transforms. Let us start with simple support capacities. The
definition of simple support functions present in the Dempster Shafer theory can
be adapted to the qualitative setting.
Definition 4. A capacity v : 2Ω → L is a simple support function (SSF) focused
on a set S if and only if
v(A) =


0 if S ⊆ A
s if S ⊆ A but A = Ω
1 if A = Ω
An SSF focused on S is non-dogmatic and is clearly a necessity measure we
denote by NS . The qualitative Mo¨bius transform of such a simple support func-
tion NS is a basic possibility assignment of the form:
NS∗(A) =


s if A = S
1 if A = Ω
0 otherwise.
Consider two simple support functions (SSFs) NA and NB where the focal
set weights are respectively NA∗(A) = α ≥ NB∗(B) = β. Then the result of the
combination NA∗ ⊗ˆNB∗ is a basic possibility assignment σAB such that
σAB(A ∩B) =
{
β if A ∩B = ∅,
0 otherwise (enforced value).
σAB(A) = α, σAB(B) = β, σAB(Ω) = 1.
The combination of Mo¨bius transforms is not necessarily a Mo¨bius transform as
the resulting capacity vAB does not have focal set B if A ∩ B = ∅ and α > β.
This capacity vAB thus has focal sets that depend upon A,B, α, β:
– vAB∗(A∩B) = β, vAB∗(A) = α, vAB∗(Ω) = 1 if A∩B = ∅, A ⊂ B and α > β
(since vAB∗(B) = 0);
– vAB∗(A ∩B) = α, vAB∗(Ω) = 1 if A ∩B = ∅ and α = β;
– vAB∗(A) = α, vAB∗(B) = β, vAB∗(Ω) = 1 if A ∩B = ∅;
– When A and B are nested (A ⊂ B) then NA∗⊗ˆNB∗ = NA∗ if β ≤ α.
The result of the conjunctive combination rules depend on the basic possibil-
ity assignments used to represent the capacity. If we combine possibilistic basic
assignments σ1, σ2 that respectively generate capacities v1 and v2 and that differ
from the Mo¨bius transforms, the result of the combination will be different if we
use σ1, σ2 and if we use Mo¨bius transforms, as already seen in Example 2.
Example 3. We consider two SSFs. Suppose A′ ⊃ A and B′ ⊃ B and let σ1 =
NA∗ but for σ1(A
′) = α and likewise σ2 = NB∗, but for σ2(B
′) = β. In the case
when A ∩B = ∅ but A′ ∩B′ = ∅, we may have that (NA∗ ⊗ˆNB∗)(A
′ ∩B′) = 0,
while (σ1 ⊗ˆσ2)(A
′ ∩B′) = min(α, β).
If we define the conjunctive combination of two capacities via operation ⊗ˆ
applied to their Mo¨bius transforms, this lack of invariance of the combination rule
for equivalent basic possibility assignments entails the following consequence:
when combining v1, v2, v3 as (i) first obtaining v12 from the basic possibilistic
assignment v1∗⊗ˆv2∗, then (ii) combining v12 and v3 by computing v12∗⊗ˆv3∗, the
result may differ from the capacity derived from σ123 = (v1∗⊗ˆv2∗)⊗ˆv3∗, since
v1∗⊗ˆv2∗ may differ from v12∗.
This state of facts forces us to define the conjunctive combination of more
than two (say k) capacities vi by combining their Mo¨bius transforms via Defini-
tion 2 in one step, avoiding the issues of associativity and lack of stability with
respect to ∼.
Definition 5. The conjunctive combination of any k-tuple of capacities vi, each
with focal sets Ai, consists in first computing the basic posssibilistic assignment
σ⊗ˆ(A) =
{
max{min(v1∗(A1), . . . , vk∗(Ak)) : A1, . . . , Ak s. t.
⋂k
i=1 Ai = A = ∅}
0 otherwise.
and the resulting capacity v(A) = maxE⊆A σ⊗ˆ(E) is denoted by v = ⊗ˆ
k
i=1vi. We
then call (v1, . . . , vn) a conjunctive decomposition of v.
If the v′is are SSFs NSi , each focused on a subset Si with weight αi, the
result of their conjunctive combination can be computed as follows. Note that
σ⊗ˆ(A) > 0 if and only if A =
⋂
{Si ∈ T } = ∅ for some family T ⊆ {S1, . . . , Sk}
of overlapping subsets (we use vi∗(Si) = αi if Si ∈ T , vi∗(Ω) = 1 and vi∗(Ai) = 0
otherwise). Then if A = Ω,
σ⊗ˆ(A) = max
T :A=
⋂
{Si∈T }
min
Si∈T
αi
and σ⊗ˆ(A) = 0 otherwise. Moreover σ⊗ˆ(Ω) = 1.
Let Kj , j = 1, . . . , p be the set of maximal families of overlapping subsets of
{S1, . . . , Sk}. The focal sets of ⊗ˆ
k
i=1NSi are thus only among the non-empty sets⋂
{Si ∈ T ⊆ Kj} for some j, including sets Si themselves. In particular, all sets
of the form
⋂
{Si ∈ Kj}, j = 1, . . . , p are (disjoint) focal sets of ⊗ˆ
k
i=1NSi .
4 Separable Non-dogmatic Capacities
A capacity v is said to be separable if and only if v = ⊗ˆ
k
i=1NSi for some SSFs.
Note that in this case, v is non-dogmatic since Ω is a focal set. Each SSFs is
viewed as a testimony of the form x is Si whose reliability is measured by αi.
4.1 Characterization of Separability
In the previous section, it can be seen that the capacity obtained by merging
two SSFs respectively focused on sets A and B is such that it has at most three
focal sets and each pair of such focal sets is either nested (e.g., A ∩ B and A)
or disjoint (e.g., A and B if disjoint). This property holds when merging more
than two SSF’s and is formally expressed as follows.
Definition 6. A family of sets F is said to be disjoint-nested if and only if the
following condition holds
∀A,B ∈ F , either A ∩B = ∅ or A ⊆ B or B ⊆ A; (2)
We can now formulate the main result of the paper:
Theorem 1. Let v : 2Ω → [0, 1] be a capacity and Fv be the set of the focal sets
of v. The three following properties are equivalent:
1. v is separable;
2. Ω ∈ Fv and Fv is disjoint-nested.
3. v = ⊗ˆS∈FvNS.
Proof. 1⇒ 2 : We consider a separable capacity v. Since v = ⊗ˆ
k
i=1NSi , suppose
A,B ∈ Fv with A ∩ B = ∅. It means that A =
⋂
{Si ∈ TA} and B =⋂
{Si ∈ TB} for some families of overlapping subsets TA, TB of {S1, . . . , Sk}.
Suppose neither A ⊆ B nor B ⊆ A hold. Then the set A ∩ B is of the
form
⋂
{Si ∈ TA ∪ TB}. In otherwords σ⊗ˆ(A ∩ B) = min(σ⊗ˆ(A), σ⊗ˆ(B)).
As a consequence either A ∈ Fv (if σ⊗ˆ(A ∩ B) = σ⊗ˆ(A)) or B ∈ Fv (if
σ⊗ˆ(A ∩B) = σ⊗ˆ(B)).
2 ⇒ 3 : Consider v′ = ⊗ˆS∈FvNS , with NS∗(S) = v∗(S). Let us show that
v′ = v under the condition (2). Suppose A ∈ Fv. Then, by (2), ∀B ∈ Fv,
A ∩ B = ∅, B, or A. So when computing σ⊗ˆ(A) one can only use families
of sets S1, . . . Sk ∈ Fv such that ∩
k
i=1Si = A where each Si contains A, and
one of them is A, due to the condition (2), where v∗(Si) > v∗(A) if Si = A.
So, σ⊗ˆ(A) = v∗(A). If A ∈ Fv it cannot be such that ∩
k
i=1Si = A for any
A1, . . . , Ak ∈ Fv due to the condition (2). So, σ⊗ˆ = v∗ and v
′ = v.
3⇒ 1 : It is obvious. 
Remark 2. The decomposition of capacities into a combination of simple support
functions is not unique. This is because if A ⊂ B thenNA⊗ˆNB = NA ifNB(B) ≤
NA(A). So we can artificially add SSFs to the decomposition of v = ⊗ˆS∈FvNS .
If v is separable, then its decomposition into a combination of simple support
functions based on its focal sets is minimal.
The structure of the set of focal sets of a separable capacity is very peculiar.
Going top down, Ω is focal with degree 1. Then we may have disjoint focal sets,
each containing a nested sequence of focal sets. In each sequence, the smallest set
may also contain disjoint focal sets, and so on, recursively. In other words, for any
focal set A, the set of focal sets B that contain A (if any) forms a chain of nested
sets, which is another way to express the necessary and sufficient condition (2)
for a capacity to be separable. Numerical belief functions with disjoint-nested
focal sets have been studied in the literature. Walley [26] showed that they are
the only ones whose combination is in agreement with the likelihood principle.
They are also studied by Giang and Shenoy [16] in the framework of dynamic
decision under uncertainty.
4.2 Non-separable Capacities
As shown in [15], each qualitative capacity v is the maximum of necessity mea-
sures: v(A) = maxmi=1 Ni(A). This decomposition is different from the one defined
by the separability property using ⊗ˆ. However they coincide for separable capac-
ities.
Proposition 1. A capacity v is separable if and only if v = maxS∈Fv NS.
Proof. Suppose v = ⊗ˆS∈FvNS . This is equivalent to have v(B) = maxA⊆B σ⊗ˆ(A),
where for A = ∅, σ⊗ˆ(A) = maxT ⊆Fv :A=∩{S∈T }minS∈T v∗(S). Since A is a focal
set of a separable v, σ⊗ˆ(A) = v∗(A). Equivalently, v(B) = maxS⊆B,S∈Fv v∗(S) =
maxS∈Fv NS(B). 
Contrary to the numerical case of separable belief functions, the separabil-
ity of a capacity v does not impose that the family of focal sets Fv is closed
under intersection. For instance, the non-dogmatic capacity with focals such that
v∗(A) = α > v∗(B) = β > v∗(A ∩B) = γ is not separable as ⊗ˆ(NA, NB , NA∩B)
since the latter is the necessity measure N with N∗(A) = α,N∗(A ∩ B) = β
(indeed σ⊗ˆ(A∩B) = β, obtained by combining A with weight α, B with weight
β and Ω fromNA∩B). Note thatN > v. This property holds for all non-separable
capacities.
Proposition 2. Suppose v is not separable, and let vˆ = ⊗ˆS∈FvNS. Then vˆ > v.
Proof. vˆ is a separable capacity whose family of focal sets Fvˆ contains only some
non-empty intersections of focal sets of v. We have, for A = ∅,
σ⊗ˆ(A) = max
T ⊆Fv,∩{S∈T }=A
min
S∈T
v∗(S) ≥ v∗(A) if A ∈ Fv letting T = {A}.
It is clear that σ⊗ˆ(A) ≥ v∗(A) if A ∈ Fv. Then we have vˆ(A) =
maxE⊆A σ⊗ˆ(E) ≥ maxE⊆A v∗(E) = v(A). As v is not separable, vˆ(A) > v(A)
for some A. 
So, each non-decomposable capacity possesses a separable upper approximation.
4.3 Examples of Separable Capacities
It is clear that non-dogmatic necessity measures N are separable since FN is
nested. Likewise, capacities whose set of focal sets contains only disjoint subsets,
on top of Ω, are separable. Note that possibility measures are not separable
because they are dogmatic since their focal sets are all singletons. However, non-
dogmatic capacities vπ whose focal sets are singletons but for Ω are separable.
Namely, there exists a subnormal possibility distribution π (maxw∈Ω π(w) < 1),
such that vπ is defined by vπ(A) = Π(A), A = Ω, and 1 otherwise. vπ is called
a pseudo-possibility measure and is such that vπ(A∪B) = max(vπ(A), vπ(B)) if
A ∪B = Ω.
Dually, the conjugate of a pseudo-possibility measure is a capacity such that
v(A∩B) = min(v(A), v(B)) whenever A∩B = ∅, which can be called a pseudo-
necessity measure.
Proposition 3. The focal sets of a pseudo-necessity measure contain only one
sequence of nested sets plus singletons with the same Mo¨bius value.
Proof. Let v be a pseudo-necessity measure. First define ǫv = minw∈Ω v({w}). If
ǫv = 0 then v is a necessity measure since if A∩B = ∅, then min(v(A), v(B)) ≤
min(v(A∪{w}), v(B ∪{w})) = v({w}) = 0. Suppose ǫv > 0. Note that ∀w ∈ Ω,
v({w}) ≥ ǫv, and there can be only one w, v(w) > ǫv. Indeed, if v({wi}) > ǫv, for
i = 1, 2, then we get the inequality min(v({w1, w}), v({w2, w})) > v({w}) = ǫv.
Let Nv be the capacity defined by Nv(A) = v(A) if v(A) > ǫv, and
0 otherwise. It is clear that Nv is a necessity measure since Nv(A ∩ B) =
min(Nv(A), Nv(B)) if v(A ∩B) > ǫv; if v(A ∩B) = ǫv then v(A ∩B) = v(A) or
v(B), so Nv(A ∩ B) = min(Nv(A), Nv(B)) = 0. The case when A ∩ B = ∅ and
min(v(A), v(B)) > ǫv is impossible since min(v(A), v(B)) ≤ min(v(A), v(A
c)) ≤
min(v(A ∪ {w}), v(Ac ∪ {w})) = ǫv. Let the focal sets of Nv form the nested
sequence A0 = Ω ⊃ A1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Ap with weights v(Ω) = 1 > α1 > · · · > αp > ǫv,
where αi = v(Si). The capacity v can be reconstructed for A = ∅ as
v(A) =
{
Nv(A) if Nv(A) > 0,
ǫv otherwise.
Its focal sets are thus {Ω,A1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Ap}∪{{w} : w ∈ Ω}, where v∗({w}) = ǫv.
They are disjoint-nested, i.e., clearly satisfy the separability condition (2). 
Corollary 1. A pseudo-necessity function is separable.
But not all separable capacities take this form, since pseudo-necessities must
have only one nontrivial chain of non-singleton focal sets.
Example 4. The non-dogmatic capacity v with v(Ei) = αi > 0, i = 1, 2 with
E1 ∩ E2 = ∅ is separable: v = NE1⊗ˆNE2 . However if there are Ai ⊃ Ei, i = 1, 2
with A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, then v(A1 ∩ A2) = 0, but v(Ai) > 0, i = 1, 2, so it is not a
pseudo-necessity measure. 
5 A Framework for Qualitative Information Fusion
Consider a set of k sources, each delivering a piece of information about an
entity x in the form of a statement x ∈ Si ⊂ Ω, one can view as a testimony.
The receiver may attach a weight αi to each source i, which assesses confidence
in the truth of statement x ∈ Si. We assume no source is fully reliable (i.e.,
αi < 1, i = 1, . . . , k), nor irrelevant (i.e., αi > 0, i = 1, . . . , k).
Formally, this body of evidence can be viewed as a basic possibility assign-
ment
σ(A) =


αi, if A = Si, i = 1, . . . , k,
1 if A = Ω,
0 otherwise.
5.1 Non-destructive vs. Destructive Merging
The capacity v induced by σ as v(A) = maxB⊆A σ(B) is non-dogmatic and
achieves a representation of the set of testimonies where redundant sources are
eliminated. A source i is redundant when there is j = i such that Sj ⊆ Si and
αi ≤ αj . We can write v as v = max
k
i=1 NSi . The focal sets of v other than Ω
are the set Si corresponding to sources that are not redundant. Note that the
condition αi < 1 is not imperative here as all capacities, including dogmatic ones
take the form v = maxki=1 NSi for suitable values of k and suitable sets Si. In
particular one may have αi = 1, i = 1, . . . , k, and get a 0–1-valued capacity.
This process can be viewed as a non-destructive fusion operation, as infor-
mation items from all non-redundant sources are preserved.
In contrast, if we compute possibility distributionsπi(w)=
{
1 if w ∈ Si
ν(αi) otherwise.
,
where ν is the order-reversing map on L, the usual fusion process in possibility
theory would consist in computing π∧ = min
k
i=1 πi, and then obtaining the neces-
sity measure N(A) = ν(maxw ∈A π∧(w)) = minw ∈Amaxi:w ∈Si αi. However, it is
very likely that π∧ will be subnormalized, and that a large part of the informa-
tion supplied by the sources is lost. In that case, the alternative fusion method is
disjunctive, and computes π∨ = max
k
i=1 πi, which comes down to computing the
necessity measure minki=1 NSi < v. Again the result is getting rid of source infor-
mation, and may considerably increase ignorance. For instance, in the case of two
conflicting sources S1, S2, such that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, π∧(w) = ν(max(α1, α2)) and
π∨(w) = 1,∀w ∈ S1 ∪ S2. The two pieces of information are destroyed by these
fusion operations while they can be retrieved from v. This kind of (usual) fusion
process is thus destructive.
5.2 Connection with Belnap Logic
Computing the capacity value v(A) from a basic possibility assignment for all
subsets A is similar to the inconsistent information management set-ups in Bel-
nap logic [3]. In this approach, sources supply information, and each one declares
each atomic proposition pj , j = 1, . . . q of a language as true, false or unknown.
Overall, each such atomic proposition is attached a value t(pj) ∈ {T, F,N,B}
summarizing what sources said about pj , and providing the epistemic status of
atomic propositions:
t(pj) =


T if at least one source declared pj true and none declared it false,
F if at least one source declared pj false and none declared it true,
N if no source declared pj true nor false,
B if at least one source declared pj true and one declared it false,
The values N,T, F,B respectively stand for “None, True, False, Both”. The
epistemic status of other propositions built from the atomic propositions pj ’s
is then obtained using 4-valued truth tables [4]. The set of values {T, F,N,B}
forms a bilattice, i.e., is equipped with two ordering relations: the information
ordering <I such that N <I T <I B and N <I F <I B, expressing the idea
of being less informed, and the truth-ordering <t such that F <t N <t T and
F <t B <t T , expressing the idea of being less true (in fact, less credible, here).
This framework has been extended in [5] to the case where any kind of
information can be supplied by sources, in the form x ∈ Si ⊂ Ω, using 0–1
capacities. Namely, we can build the Boolean (in particular, dogmatic) capacity
v such that v = maxki=1 NSi whose focal sets form the family Fv = min⊂{Si, i =
1, . . . , k} of sets Si minimal for inclusion (eliminating redundant information).
Note that v(A) = 1 means that there is a source that supports A, so that the set
of Belnap truth-values can be captured by pairs (v(A), v(Ac)) ∈ {0, 1}2. Namely
– T corresponds to v(A) = 1, v(Ac) = 0 (credibility of A);
– F corresponds to v(A) = 0, v(Ac) = 1 (implausibility of A);
– N corresponds to v(A) = 0, v(Ac) = 0 (ignorance about A);
– B corresponds to v(A) = 1, v(Ac) = 1 (conflicting information about A);
The framework of qualitative capacities naturally provides a valued extension
of the bilattice structure, considering (v(A), v(Ac)) ∈ L2 as a description of
how much support sources of information provide to A and its negation. The
information ordering is then of the form (v(A), v(Ac)) ≤I (v(B), v(B
c)) if and
only if v(A) ≤ v(B) and v(Ac) ≤ v(Bc), which means that sources inform
less about A than about B, interpreting conflict as an excess of information.
The truth-ordering <t can be extended by requiring that the opinion of sources
about A be less positive than the opinion about B, which can be formalized as:
(v(A), v(Ac)) ≤t (v(B), v(B
c)) ⇐⇒ v(B) ≥ v(A) and v(Bc) ≤ v(Ac).
This is a partial ordering on graded pairs. The structure (L ⊗ L,≤I ,≤t) is
a double partially ordered set that extends the bilattice structure of Belnap. It
is a lattice with the disjunction (a, a′) ∨I (b, b
′) = (max(a, b),max(a′, b′)) and
the conjunction (a, a′) ∧I (b, b
′) = (min(a, b),min(a′, b′)). And also another lat-
tice with operations (a, a′) ∨t (b, b
′) = (max(a, b),min(a′, b′)), (a, a′) ∧t (b, b
′) =
(min(a, b),max(a′, b′)); there is also a negation that consists of switching v(A)
and v(Ac) (which reminds of intuitionistic fuzzy sets); see [8] for algebraic con-
siderations of such extended bilattices.
5.3 The Maximal Consistent Subsets Approach
The non-destructive approach to information fusion only collects information
items supplied by sources, in the spirit of Belnap information processor, without
trying to cross-fertilize them. In particular, if source 1 says x ∈ S1 and source
2 says x ∈ S2, we still have v(S1 ∩ S2) = v(S
c
1 ∪ S
c
2) = 0, that is, as receivers,
we do not conclude x ∈ S1 ∩ S2. However, many fusion methods assume we can
make this step unless S1 ∩ S2 = ∅: it is a basic fusion principle in logic [20]
and uncertainty theories [14]. This view can be captured if we push the previous
non-destructive merging further, by constructing vˆ = ⊗ˆ
k
i=1NSi , a non-dogmatic
separable capacity, which presupposes αi < 1,∀i.
This idea was briefly proposed in [1], where consistent subsets of pieces of
information obtained from subsets of sources are combined, forming a lattice of
arguments where the results are attached to set of sources whose credibility can
be taken into account. Considering maximal subsets of consistent sources Kj , j =
1, . . . p, each Kj yields a nested family of focal sets of vˆ. Namely suppose Kj =
{Sj1 , . . . , Sjnj }, with αj1 > · · · > αjnj , then the sets Sj1 , Sj1 ∩ Sj2 , . . . ,∩
nj
ℓ=1Sjℓ
are focal sets of vˆ, with respective weights αj1 > · · · > αjnj . There are p such
chains in Fvˆ. Again we can compare the epistemic statuses of propositions x ∈ A
from the information provided from sources after cross-checking, by applying the
information and the truth orderings to pairs (vˆ(A), vˆ(Ac)), A ⊆ Ω. Note that vˆ
is more informative than v since (vˆ(A), vˆ(Ac)) ≥I (v(A), v(A
c)), as examplified
in Example 5 and in Table 1, and already proved by Proposition 2.
Table 1. Non-destructive vs. conjunctive fusion
A {4} [2, 4] {5} [1, 3] {2,5}
(v(A), v(Ac)) (0,0.4) (0.4, 0.2) (0, 0.8) (0.4, 0.5) (0, 0)
(vˆ(A), vˆ(Ac)) (0.5, 0.4) (0.5, 0.4) (0.2, 0.8) (0.4, 0.5) (0.2, 0)
Example 5. Suppose Ω = [1, 6] the set of integers between 1 and 6. There are 4
weighted sources and S1 = [1, 4], S2 = [4, 5], S3 = [2, 3], S4 = [5, 6], with respec-
tive weights 0.8, 0.5, 0.4, 0.2. Using the first approach defines a capacity that has
these 4 focal sets plus [1, 6]. Using the second approach, the maximal consistent
subsets are K1 = {[1, 4], [2, 3]},K2 = {[1, 4], [4, 5]},K3 = {[4, 5], [5, 6]}. Capac-
ity vˆ has focal sets with weights: {([2, 3], 0.4), ([1, 4], 0.8), ({4}, 0.5), ({5}, 0.2)},
plus ([1, 6], 1). Table 1 compares the two approaches via pairs (v(A), v(Ac)): note
that precise information items, rejected by the non-destructive approach become
conflicting under the conjunctive one. But regarding {2, 5}, the conjunctive com-
bination restores consistency where the non-destructive approach is ignorant.
Example 6. Finally we can consider a qualitative counterpart of the famous
Peter, Paul and Mary case after Smets [23]. A crime has been committed and
Table 2. The Peter, Paul and Mary case
v vˆ v vˆ v vˆ
({Pa}, {Pe,Ma}) (0, α) (α, α) ({Pe}, {Pa,Ma}) (0, β) (0, β) ({Ma}, {Pe, Pa}) (α, α) (α, α)
the killer is known to be among Peter, Paul and Mary. There are three pieces
of evidence. One source claims the killer is a male (with weight α) and another
source claims it is a female (with the same weight α). Finally, another source
claims that Peter has an alibi (with stronger confidence β > α). So we first define
the capacity v on {Pe, Pa,Ma} such that v∗({Pe, Pa}) = v∗({Ma}) = α, and
v∗({Ma,Pa}) = β. Now let us combine these information items and get the sep-
arable upper approximation vˆ of v. Its Moebius transform is the same as the one
of v but for vˆ∗(Pa) = α = min(v∗({Ma,Pa}), v∗({Pe, Pa}). See Table 2. While,
as expected, Peter is considered the least credible killer, v seems to exonerate
Paul against Mary (even if information concerning her is just contradictory),
while vˆ puts Mary and Paul back on a par.
6 Conclusion
This paper has explored some formal similarities between belief functions and
qualitative capacities, initiated in [15,19], by studying the counterparts of sep-
arable belief functions in relation with information fusion problems. We have
focused on the merging of uncertain qualitative testimonies. We have shown
that the qualitative counterpart of Dempster rule of combination applied to
uncertain qualitative testimonies leads to separable capacities whose focal sets
are either disjoint or nested. This notion of separability turns out to be more
drastic than in the numerical setting for belief functions. Indeed, Shafer [21] has
shown that the set of focal sets of a separable belief function is closed under non-
empty intersections, and Smets [22] has shown that any belief function can be
obtained by a kind of division between the commonalities of two separable belief
functions, leading to interpret them as the fusion of both elementary testimonies
and prejudices against their conjunctions [11]. In the qualitative case, the set of
focal sets of separable capacities does not contain non-nested overlapping sets,
so that we cannot reconstruct a non-separable capacity from two separable ones
by a kind of subtraction. However, results related to symmetric minimum and
maximum [17] suggest a possibility of erasing Mo¨bius weights. Another line of
study would be to replace the min and/or max in the qualitative Dempster rule
by operations, inducing the leximin and leximax orderings, on multisets obtained
from the concatenation of weights [9,10]. For instance, the combination of NA
and NB with respective weights on A and B equal to α and β, would yield focal
sets A with weight (α, 1), B with weight (1, β) and A ∩ B with weight (α, β),
where (α, β) < (α, 1) and (α, β) < (1, β) in the sense of leximin. This approach
may extend the range of separability for capacities.
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